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Cognition as a Transformative
Process
Re-affirming a Classical Pragmatist Understanding
Vera Saller and Donata Schoeller
1 We begin with brief remarks on the debate on non-conceptuality. We show that certain
aspects of a pragmatist approach have found its ways into today’s discussions. However,
the  underlying  understanding  of  knowledge  based  on the  justification  of  beliefs  has
stayed untouched in this discussion, and the classical pragmatist approach has not been
considered. Dealing with the question whether a qualitative dimension in cognition is a
relapse in givenism, we argue that this is not the case when taking the implications of
knowledge  as  transformational  process  seriously.  Re-introducing  the  perspectives  of
Peirce,  Dewey  and  Gendlin  we  show  how  an  interactive  fine-grained  description  of
knowledge as a transformative process explicates the pragmatist concern of cognition as
a  fundamental  prerequisite  to  meet  the  challenges  of  human  life.  By  conceiving
knowledge as a transformative and interactional process, one acknowledges at the same
time  the  dimension  of  “firstness”  in  experience.  Our  paper  aims  to  show  that  this
acknowledgment does not imply falling back into the Myth of the Given.
 
1. Pragmatist Shifts in the Debate on Non-Conceptual
Contents of Knowledge
2 In his early book Mind and World (1994), John McDowell insists on the conceptuality of
non-conceptual content drawing powerfully on Kantian perspectives. According to him, a
deeper  dualism  behind  the  relation  of  the  conceptual  and  intuitive  components  of
knowledge  has  to  be  acknowledged:  the  Kantian  problem  of  how  to  relate  reason’s
spontaneity to a receptivity grounded in the natural realm of law. McDowell’s response to
this challenge is to lay out a bigger picture of human development, including the fact that
human beings are born into a language that “serves as a repository of tradition, a store of
historically accumulated wisdom about what is a reason for what” (McDowell 1994: 126).
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His suggestion to integrate “Bildung” into the natural  development of  human beings
seems to arrive where classical pragmatists begin.
3 On a more detailed level of argument, however, McDowell demonstrates concepts in use
even when there seems to be no identifiable concept available for what is experienced.
Responding  to  Gareth  Evans’  (1982)  argument  that  humans  often  find  themselves
confronted with aspects of the world they do not have any concepts for, for instance a
certain shade of color, McDowell points out that, even in this case, one can nevertheless
refer to “that shade of color.” The capacity for recognition is another strand of evidence
McDowell  presents  for  every  moment  of  perceptual  intake  being  conceptual,  thus
claiming that the capacity for recognition calls for conceptual memory (1994: 46).
4 Christopher Peacocke famously argued against these suggestions with what is now called
“The Fineness of Grain” argument. By taking account of phenomenological aspects of
experience that exceed the conceptual repertoire (cf. Peacocke 2001), Peacocke indicates
how perceptually based discrimination of properties and experience of moments are so
replete with content that goes beyond memory and identification (ibid.: 251). He argues
every detail of the lived situation cannot be remembered but even if memory were as
finely  discriminative  as  perception,  the  recognition  argument  would  not  hold  when
perceiving properties for the first time. Peacocke’s insistence on perceptual quality also
implies  that  “the  content  of  perception  is  more  fine-grained  than  the  content  of
propositional attitudes” (Bermúdez & Cahen 2012).
5 Suggesting that non-conceptuality is distinct from conceptuality in “making it available,”
Peacocke (2001: 244) seems to envision non-conceptuality as a kind of active base for
concepts, thus coming closer to the phenomenological perspectives emphasized by classic
pragmatist  thinkers  (as  we will  show below).  McDowell  himself  will  have shifted his
position  in  the  years  to  come.  By  dropping  the  assumption  of  experience  as  mere
actualizations of conceptual capacities, his claims draw more closely on Kant’s notion of
intuition, understanding rational capacities to permeate our experiences, even those “we
act on unreflectively in our ordinary coping with our surroundings” (McDowell 2008: 13).
6 Further steps in a pragmatist direction have been explicitly or inexplicitly taken by more
recent contributions to the debate. Robert Hanna’s lucid overview on the debate provides
strong interventions for the non-conceptualist side, also by drawing heavily on Kant. Yet,
juxtaposing the “Grip of the Given” to the famous “Myth of the Given,” Hanna introduces
perspectives  of  continuity  that  clearly  exceed  the  Kantian  positions,  while  also
reformulating  non-conceptual  content  as  “situated  content.”  By  considering  whole
situations,  the  perspective  on  non-conceptual  content  is  widened  beyond  the  mere
perceptual intake. He also includes evolutionary perspectives in our understanding of
cognition and reminds us not to forget a
[…] continuous thread-of-life by which the world is sensorimotor-subjectively or
pre-reflectively  consciously  delivered  up from human animal  experience  to  our
self-conscious or self-reflective thought and action-oriented deliberation. (Hanna
2011: 390)
7 The “grip of the given” as embodied, contextualized living provides the basis from which
deliberate thinking arises (ibid.). Continuity, as suggested by Hanna, has to be considered
in mutual transformative, rather than in exclusive relations between what is conceived as
conceptual  and non-conceptual  contents,  as  well  as  between non-human and human
aspects of experience.
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8 In a careful analysis of the debate between McDowell and Hubert Dreyfus, Dan Zahavi
(2013)  seems  to  complement  Hanna’s  line  of  argument,  by  pointing  to  the
unsurmountable  discontinuity  between  animal  and  children  on  the  one  hand,  and
rational, lingual beings on the other, which seems implied in McDowell’s position (cf. also,
Welchman 2008; Godfrey-Smith 2010: 317). However, both authors, according to Zahavi,
share a concept of mindedness that does not account for the character of “prereflective
selfconsciousness” resp. “for-me-ness of experience.”
9 A similar direction is taken up in Steven Levine’s (2012) critical  discussion of  Robert
Brandom’s “rationalist pragmatism” (Brandom 2011: 32). Levine carefully lays out some
side  effects  of  Brandom’s  position  and  demonstrates  how it  re-affirms  a  subtle,  yet
decisive separation between rational capacities and bodily responses. Drawing explicitly
on John Dewey to point to the developmental character of rational capacities,  Levine
suggests ways to overcome the kind of rupture he detects in Brandom’s thinking. By
considering rational behaviors as an acquired capacity “that develop in time due to a
series of overlapping processes” (Levine 2012: 16), the divide between articulated reasons
for action and the responding body closes. A similar emphasis on development in regards
to conceptual schemes as well as language can be found in Jennifer Welchman’s article
(2008) on Dewey and McDowell.
 
2. Knowledge As Transformational Practice
10 Before moving on to a classical  pragmatist  understanding of  cognition,  which,  as we
would like to suggest, is first and foremost, to be characterized as a transformative
process,  it  seems  worthwhile to  note  a  common  denominator  on  which  the  above-
mentioned arguments seem to operate. This consists in the internalized critique of what
Wilfrid  Sellars  famously  termed the  “Myth of  the  Given”  (2000/1956).  With  “given,”
Sellars depicts an epistemological blindspot in which observations as states of knowing
are given as an empirical description, instead of being understood as elements in the
logical space of reasons, in which one is justifying and able to justify what one says.
11 Knowledge implied by the Myth, as McDowell summarizes, is “entitlement to judge that
things are thus and so because experience reveals things are thus and so: for instance,
seeing that something is  thus and so” (2008:  2).  Nothing immediately “given,” as we
convincingly learn from the critics of the “Myth,” can act as a guarantee that judgements
or beliefs about things being in one way or another are true. The wrongness of the Myth
of the Given is widely discussed in regards to its wrongly held foundational functions
concerning the possibility of justified knowledge and in making sentences and theories
true.  Donald  Davidson  summarizes  this  as  a  mistake  in  category:  “no  thing  makes
sentences and theories true.” (Davidson 1974: 194; original emphasis).
12 However, with a few exceptions, this kind of critique and its many variations leave the
concept  of  knowledge  as  justified  beliefs  untouched  or  unquestioned.  True  or  at  least
verifiable propositions of things being “such and so” seem to remain the accepted basis
on which different strategies of criticism of the misconception of the “given” set forth.
13 In the following, we do not lay out yet another strategy responding to the threat of the
Myth. Rather, we want to emphasize aspects of cognition which are blind spots in this kind
of approach to knowledge, centering chiefly on justification of beliefs.
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14 By bringing the classical  pragmatists  into the discussion,  we would like to shift  this
perspective  on  knowledge  by  emphasizing  its  development  and  its  fundamental
usefulness for the human species. We will say more clearly in which way the respective
pragmatist approach introduces a transformational approach to epistemology, and how
this radically challenges a foundational understanding of knowledge, with its polarity of
either assuming something ‘given’ that justifies beliefs, or the threat of skepticism.
15 Re-affirming a classical pragmatist stance will also remind us that justifiable claims are
results  of  manifold  practices  transforming  situational  complexity  into  useful  beliefs
within a space of reason. Classical pragmatists have demonstrated that these processes
need to be closely considered in order to understand a transformational and processual
character of cognition.
16 We have to ask ourselves however, whether by referring to “qualitative experiences” of
situations  and  “Firstness”  of  impressions  in  the  Deweyan  and  Peircean  sense,  for
example,  we  slide  back  into  givenness  as  Colin  Koopman  suggests  (2009:  76).  In
emphasizing practice as the main element of his understanding of Pragmatism’s theory of
knowledge he stresses transitionality as a main feature of cognition, emphasizing the
historical and temporal change process of all knowledge (Koopman 2009). We appreciate
his emphasis on practice, yet Koopman avoids the qualitative dimension of experience,
out of fear to fall back into the “Myth.” Disregarding the qualitative dimension of real
situations in which knowledge makes transisitions neglects to take account of the non-
contingent character of the transitional movement he highlights. To keep it safe from any
danger of givenism, the word practice in his approach thus gains an important role while
at the same time hardly obtaining any detailed description or attention. Koopman writes:
[…] the transitionalist’s account also has no need for referring to experience and
language  as  supplying  the  basis  upon  which  practice  is  elaborated.  Practice  is
elaborated  only  upon  itself,  that  is,  upon  its  own  accumulated  historical
furnishings.  It  confronts  only  with  ongoing  stream  of  practice  in  its  further
construction and reconstructions of itself. (Koopman 2009: 118)
17 The problem of the Myth of the Given, from this vantage point, dissolves, but so do people
and the real experienced challenges of daily situations, which are met by knowledge that
makes  a  difference.  Practice  seems  to  need  nothing  but  more  practice,  stripped  of
predicaments of contexts, challenges, problems, as well as dangers and opportunities that
arise through the way they are handled and formulated.
18 In contrast to Koopman’s resistance towards an experiential embededness of practice, the
initial  pragmatist  move  consists  in  tying  together  rational  cognition  and  situational
specificity, as the founding father Dewey quotes William James:
The effective meaning of any philosophic proposition can always be brought down
to some particular consequence, in our future practical experience, whether active
or passive; the point lying rather in the fact that the experience must be particular,
than in the fact that it must be active. (Dewey’s Italics) (Dewey 1916: 710-1/James
1904: 674)
19 Dewey  introduces  the  term  “situation”  along  the  lines  of  qualitative  and  complex
experiences,  which  allow  close  up  studies  of  cognition  as  a  subtle  and  intricate
interaction. In comparison to these fine-grained perspectives, Koopman’s reference to
practice seems rather abstract. In contrast, also Peircean “Firstness,” which he criticizes
as  falling  for  giveness,  is  a  processual  moment  of  cognition,  itself  a  product  of
interpretative  processes  and  evolving  systems  of  interconnected  signs.  A  dynamic
emergence  of  a  world  in  need of  conceptual  forms for  clarification also  implies  the
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development of a space of reasons. The space of reasons thus becomes one dynamic aspect
of a wider and intricate evolving system of inter-related meanings involved in knowledge.
20 Also for Dewey,  neither language nor experience can be focused on in isolation,  but
always  in  relation to  the  continuity  of  body-environment  interactions  responding to
continuous needs.
21 The same applies to Eugene Gendlin’s epistemological approaches and his philosophy of
language. His embodied, interactional understanding of the development of knowledge is
based on his rigorous close-up studies of meaning making processes, which is why we call
him a Classical Pragmatist of the third generation.
22 With Gendlin,  the Classical Pragmatist approach to practice becomes even more fine-
grained. His methods of Focusing and Thinking-at-the-Edge draw on tacit dimensions of
knowledge, the “authority” of which is not “given,” but in need of constant, sometimes
very subtle practices, such as a slight shift in awareness or attitude. Next to interpretative
process, Gendlin demonstrates how slight differences in attending to a felt dimension of
experience can make an important difference in practice.  Taking into account vague
beginnings to evolve into fruitful cognitive processes and to be transformed into (more)
stable and explicit forms of knowing, knowledge as a transformational process implies
practices cultivating situational experiences on different fine-grained levels. This is the
recurrent theme that motivates the choice of our three classical pragmatist thinkers.
 
3. Peirce’s First and Habits
23 It was Joseph Ransdell (1979) who showed that regarding perception, Charles S. Peirce
had overcome the traditional alternative between the skylla of naive realism and the
charybdis of skepticism more than a hundred years ago. The pragmatistic turn, initiated
by  Peirce,  succeeded  in  this  by  combining  the  customarily  conflicting  doctrine  of
representative content on the one hand and immediate perception on the other. This was
possible  because  he  differentiated  the  immediate  sense  impact,  which  he  named
“percept”  from  perception  (or  perceptual  judgement)  and  introduced  the  abductive
inference.  The  “percept”  as  raw  sense  impression  in  its  Firstness  is  left  in  total
potentiality (indeterminacy), whereas thoughts as Thirdness have become conceptual and
conventional.
24 One could argue that  the gap between iconic Firstness and conceptualized Thirdness
corresponds  to  the  dichotomy  alluded  to  in  the  contemporary  debate.  But  Peirce’s
account shifts the picture because 1) he considers perception as one dynamic instant in
the more encompassing process of thinking and acting, 2) the consideration of thought as
sign process on different levels overcomes the polarization of dichotomies, and 3) his
theory of abduction opens up a spectrum of cognitive movements shedding a new light on
whether these processes are to be considered as rational or pre-rational.
25 Peirce conceived of thinking as a process of sign-interpretation through and through. In
other words, he showed that there is no state, which is not a sign-process, even if this
may  be  considered  as  pre-reflective.  By  demonstrating  that  thinking  is  not  possible
without signs, he found different ways to conceive how pre-conceptual states do not have
to be discursive and are still permeated by rational capacities without underestimating
their  difference  to  propositional  content,  yet  without  introducing  a  rupture  either.
Instead of  re-emphazising  the  two  classical  components  of  knowledge,  his  radical
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thinking of  signs opened up ways to reflect  thought and knowledge as a  continuous
process reaching from preconceptual states to propositional statements, always moving
and finding new formulations and meaning:
From the proposition that every thought is a sign, it follows that every thought
must address itself to some other, must determine some other, since that is the
essence of a sign. (CP 5.253)
26 His consideration of these processes is intrinsically interwoven with his categories. We
already mentioned McDowell’s argument for conceptuality in sensations, where he shifts
from an iconically lived instant to an indexically meant “this shade.” Distinguishing the
iconically experienced sense from the indexically experienced shade of color, indicates
two different aspects of a process, aspects that cannot substitute each other, but that
build and transform each other. The indexical this points to a certain trait of reality, to
this shade of color. The indexical aspect is second to the iconically lived moment, it is the
next step of becoming aware of a thing in the interpretative process. It is the second level,
the level before we are able to tag something with a name – which would be the level of
the Third. The reference to indexical experience does not refute non-conceptual content
however. In trying to understand perception, it is not only the registering of things that
attract our attention that matters. Peirce’s iconicity allows us to take into account that
our orientation in the world includes many things that we perceive without them being
the focus of our attention. A major part of being able to act in the world and in situations
happens, as Peirce rightly points out, with only peripheral awareness. This is especially
true of bodily sense of somatic consciousness, like balance, temperature and quality of
air. For example, we are habitually capable of adapting to the temperature of a room, by
opening and closing windows and doors and by adding another piece of  clothing,  or
taking it off.  Until a person begins to feel uncomfortable, one does not pay any focal
attention to the definable temperature of the surroundings.
27 Although Peirce rather seldom refers to bodily feelings as such his notion of iconicity and
indexicality implies a bodily situation in every further sign process. This enriches today’s
debates,  which  often  claim  the  importance  of  including  the  prereflective  embodied
experience of situations. The Peircean notion of habit plays a noteworthy role in this
respect. Hubert L. Dreyfus (2013) describes moments of absorption in sportive activities
and habitual orientation as entirely without participation of consciousness and nearly
automatized.  Zahavi  (2013)  rightly  criticizes  these  descriptions  for  denying  the
phenomenological  important aspects of  pre-reflective self-consciousness and “for-me-
ness of experience.” Here,  the categories of First  and Third could become germanely
useful in precise ways. Habitual bodily actions and absorbed states are not guided by self-
conscious  understanding;  nevertheless,  they  are  mindful  and sociable.  This  does  not
mean that they are conceptual,  because we understand deliberation as developing in
levels, as an ever-growing net of relations of interconnected signs. The finely woven web
of signs includes images, sounds and smells as well as clearly differentiated concepts.
“For-me-ness experience” certainly happens on a more indexical or iconical level. 
28 The capacity to react reasonably on a bodily level of learned habits is  the subject of
Levine’s (2012) criticism of Brandom. Although he neither mentions Peirce nor benefits
from the possibilities afforded by his sign-theory, he “re-discovers” the importance of
habits.
But while passive, habits and bodily skills nonetheless have a rational intelligibility
or significance that is determined by the intelligibility of the projects of which they
are a part. When this intelligibility is disrupted because our habits and bodily skills
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can no longer unreflectively cope with the situation into which they have been
drawn,  the  active  capacities  for  deliberation  and  practical  reasoning  emerge.
(Levine 2012: 13)
29 At the end of his article, Levine mentions Dewey, but not Peirce. Nevertheless, he shows a
way to defend classical pragmatists, especially Peirce, providing ways to think beyond the
Myth. Levine writes:
If  we  stick  to  the  practical  case,  we  can  avoid  this  conception  [the  Myth]  by
recognizing that the capacities that make action possible – i.e., the ability to reason
practically and to act on bodily habits – are acquired capacities that are relatively
plastic,  i.e.,  are  one’s  [sic!]  that  develop  over  time.  (Levine  2012:  14;  original
emphasis)
30 This  suggests  that  current  discussions  end  at  the  point  where  Peirce’s  fundamental
dictum “all thought is in signs” (CP 5.253) indicates a path. More inclusion of Peircean
thought promises to bring further fruitful inspirations to these debates. We will continue
unfolding just a couple of these.
31 The gap between First and Third is completed by the Second, the indexical contact with
reality,  which  ignites  the  mental  activity  of  abduction.  This  intrinsically  entails  the
possibility of error. To admit that humans are, in fact, capable of “taking hold of aspects
of  world”  (McDowell  1994:  58)  while  simultaneously  bearing  in  mind  possible
misrepresentation, is a major feature in Peirce’s categorical thinking. Accounting for the
embodied ways of contact with the world without taking this to be any kind of authority
for the interpretation of  things being “such and so,” is  the important lesson today’s
discourse can learn from Peirce. It was his way of responding to the classical threat of
skepticism. The possibility of failure initiated philosophers’ refusal of naive realism and
drew them in the direction of radical skepticism.
32 Especially in the time of Peirce, new evidence of the weakness of our sensory organs and
bistable  pictures,  like  Schröder’s  staircase  and  Joseph  Jastrow’s  duck/rabbit  were  a
matter of public interest. Like Ludwig Wittgenstein, Peirce showed particular interest in
these cognitive puzzles.1 
33 With the category of the Second, one seems to touch the ontological level. If we suggest
that Peirce considered the Second as the moment when we encounter reality, many may
ask: what reality? Peirce was a skeptic in the sense that he acknowledged the necessary
impact  of  cultural  meanings  which  form  our  perception  and imply  the  danger  of
perceptive  deformation,  as  well  as  the  obvious  possibility  of  false  interpretation.
Nevertheless, he always allowed for the reality of a mind-independent world, as well as
the clash with this kind of pre-conceptual reality. It is this reality and its challenge, which
he  took  to  be  the  ultimate  target  of  science.2 Compared  with  contemporary  and
postmodern authors,  one of  the  most  surprising facts  in  Peircean philosophy is  this
tension: although he insists that we do not have direct access to the world without the
mediation of signs,  he nonetheless stresses what can be called the phenomenological
aspect of experience that exceeds a conceptual grip. This is most apparent in the aspect of
iconicity. Iconicity as the most basic sign-level takes experience to be a sign for further
experience. One relates to the world’s properties, in which one is embedded, not only
with concepts but also with embodied needs and primary dependency towards others.
34 According to Peirce, these needs and dependencies are expressing themselves within a
net of interconnected signs, on the pre-conceptual level as icons and indexes (First and
Second),  slowly  developing  into  conceptual  meanings  (Third).  However,  we  must
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remember that the development of meaning is a process of continuous learning. Peirce’s
iconic level is a powerful tool to include these primary bonds as agencies of learning. On
this  iconic  level  no sharp distinctions are to be drawn since icons are not  signs  for
different  things,  but  lay  the  ground  for  a  potential  interpretation.  Because  a  smell
reminds us of another or “looking at the one is like looking at the other in some respects.
[…] It is the base on which all other forms of representation are built.” (Deacon 1997:
76f.). In this way signs, experience and world cannot be separated (cf. Jung 2009; 2013).
35 Compared  to  the  dual  pattern,  which  permeates  debates  on  the  Myth  and  on
conceptuality  versus  non-conceptuality,  Peirce’s  approach  unfolds  the  multifaceted
structure of conceptuality, based on three levels, similarity (icon), contiguity (index) and
conventionality (symbol). In today’s discourse, it is Hanna (2011) who expresses the need
for understanding the process of knowledge developing in levels (cf. also Schlicht 2008).
As  already mentioned,  his  approach is  based on an unconventional  analysis  of  Kant,
regrettably without mentioning Peirce.  Peirce allows us to think,  that before explicit
conceptual interpretation even starts, we have the capability to “liken”3 traits of reality.
On this “first” level, perception functions iconically. The shapes that we perceive in the
first  sensory  impression  are  not  deliberately  classified  yet.  Following  the  Peircean
categories,  it  is  very  clear  that  the  signs  on  the  level  of  First  elicit  the  responsive
capability to assimilate properties of things. It is the human senses that are assigned to
“liken” properties with their grasp, be this fingers, ears, skin, nose, tongue or eyes. It is
again Ransdell  (1979)  who reminds us that  this  principle of  iconicity is  originally an
Aristotelian  idea.4 Nevertheless,  it  seems  completely  forgotten  in  contemporary
discussions.
36 The  potentiality  of  the  unformulated  percept  on  the  level  of  First  reminds  us  of
something further. Insofar it is not conceptualized or at least understood as indicating
something  (as  indexical  pointing  does),  the  percept  is  not  a  distinct  intake.  This  is
important to answer the question whether Peirce would agree with the idea of  non-
conceptual content. As the content of iconic signs is not conceptualized, couldn’t we call
it non-conceptual? The question is, if iconic resemblances already mean “content,” or just
a germ of a developing sign – more accurately – having the potential to develop. For this
question we have to keep in mind that there are no purely iconical signs, in other words,
there is  no strict  separation of  the categories  since every sign is  constituted by the
interrelation of all three levels. Also, the sensual intake does not have any meaning per
se, in isolation.
37 It is intrinsically relational to memories or images of past experience and to pressing
needs  of  the  body,  in  this  way it  has  the  capacity  to  become meaningful  in  several
transformational steps or shifts.
38 In developmental psychological descriptions of how newborns experience the world, the
phenomenological and developmental character of the First  gathered evidence. Daniel
Stern (1985) summarizes the rich material of experiments and observations, presenting
the “interactional world of babies” in an empathic way to the reader. A most surprising
result from a series of experiments was the fact that babies have cross-sensual capacities
(e.g. rhythms, visual images or sounds) already shortly after birth. They recognize their
mother by her face, as well as by her scent or the way she walks, breathes or talks. In a
similar  way,  the  new field  of  neuro-phenomenology  emphasizes  the  capacity  of  the
mature human mind to transformatively interrelate a variety of sensual inputs on the
fringes of awareness:
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The  analysis  of  the  descriptions  we  have  gathered,  demonstrates  that  the
vocabulary used to describe the “stuff of felt meanings” often simultaneously calls
on several sensorial registers: the visual (shape, shadow, fuzzy etc.), the kinetic, and
the  tactile  (vibration,  pulsation,  pressure,  density,  weight,  texture,  temperature
etc.),  the auditory (echo,  resonance,  rhythm etc.)  and even the olfactory or the
gustative. (Petitmengin 2007: 63)
39 Only if one fails to account for the first person aspect of growth and development of
meaning, can one regard such experiential process,  as Koopman does,  as a danger of
falling back into givenism (2009: 122).
 
4. Dewey’s Situation and Interaction
40 This is why it seems promising to us, to also take a close look at John Dewey again. He
introduces qualitative aspects of experience into the epistemological debate of his time in
a rather bold manner, stressing their vital functions for cognition. Throughout, these
passages convey an understanding of cognition that is highly dynamic and that is the
result of the transformation of any experiential material it emerges from. What is ‘given’
is never a foundational basis of knowledge, but an initial phase, changing rapidly like a
‘storm’ in ways that only allow us to speak of a stable product at the end of a process. This
processual  and  transformative  account  undermines  any  givenist  understanding  of
knowledge because it leaves behind the assumption that knowledge of something being
‘such and so’ is founded on non-conceptual perception.
41 Of course, the differences between Dewey’s and Peirce’s approach to knowledge need to
be closely studied and are subject matter of worthwhile research (cf. for example Dewey
1916; Tschaepe 2013: 39, FN 3). For our purpose here, we want to concentrate on the
continuity  of  the  classical  pragmatist  understanding  of  knowledge,  knowledge
understood as ever changing with evolving results of interpretative processes that are
grounded in the daily challenge of action and problem-solving. The non-contingency of
this  process  does  not  only  rely  on logical  structures  and measurements,  but  on the
embodied  and  lived  experience  of  situations  and  their  needs.  This  is  the  classical
pragmatist frame in which to understand intellectual operations.
42 Taking seriously daily situations, their predicaments and requirements leads beyond the
binary constellation of conceptual and pre-conceptual which pervades today’s debates.
43 Similar to Ludwig Wittgenstein, Dewey introduces a philosophically uncommon starting
point of epistemological reflection by reminding philosophers, past and present, of the
simple fact that thinking and speaking begin in situations (1930) and not with singular
perceptions  (such  as  shades  of  colors,  etc.).  From this  vantage  point,  the  level  of
abstraction of today’s debates becomes apparent: discussing experience or knowledge on
the grounds of isolated propositions within the frame of the duality of conceptual vs.
non-conceptual content, distinctions derived from the history of philosophy, not from
the predicaments of daily life.
44 Dewey, however, reminds us:
In actual experience, there is never any such isolated singular object or event; an
object  or  event  is  always  a  special  part,  phase,  or  aspect  of  an  environing
experienced world – a situation. (Dewey 1938: 66)
45 Yet, one may legitimately ask: how are situations experienced if not by perceiving and
conceptualizing? It is to this kind of question, that Dewey gives a new variety of answers.
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Thinking  about  experience  based  on  the  traditional  epistemological  split  between
concepts and perception omits to take into account how living in situations “functions”
in the way we perceive and conceptualize things. Experiencing a situation, for instance,
functions in ways that participants “know” what is relevant to say and distinguish, what
needs  no  mentioning,  what  needs  emphasis,  etc.  From  “here”  different  kinds  of
epistemological questions arise, that Gendlin, as we will show later on, develops further.
For instance, how is it  that researchers do not have to choose between thousands of
percepts or thousands of concepts what is relevant to “know” and to say? Dewey points to
a contextual,  environmental,  social,  as well  as a historically-situated starting point of
epistemological  reflection encompassing every single cognitive operation while  being
changed at the same time. Dewey’s critical attitude towards epistemological analysis is
the logical result of this view, making us aware that analysis itself is a change-process:
conditions of cognitions found in this process are a result of a reflective transformation of
what is reflected upon. The actual stages of this dynamic thinking process do not show up
anymore in the clear structure that is presented as ‘found.’ W. Teed Rockwell re-affirms
Dewey’s point about analysis’ crucial limitations, stressing that “below a certain level of
analysis,  that which is realest to us,  lived experience,  […] inevitably get(s)  bypassed”
(Rockwell 2005: 141). Once lost out of sight in the textbooks of philosophy and science, it
is difficult to bring back. McDowell, from another, more skeptical stance, acknowledges
the problem: if thought and judgment is to be recognizable as bearing on reality, there
must be external constraint that is unlike an analyzed perception of concept,  or else
thinking and speaking would be equivalent to “frictionless spinning in a void” (1994: 11).
Questions about how judgments are controlled by something outside of judgment again
lead  directly  to  the  problems  involved  in  the  Myth.  McDowell  suggests  that  by
understanding conceptual  capacities  taking  part  in  receptivity  (1994,  Lecture  1),  this
problem is overcome. Classical pragmatism goes further in opening up the bigger picture
and shifting a basic epistemological approach. Dewey directly criticizes a skeptical split in
our approach to the world:
It is only when an object of focal observation is regarded as an object of knowledge
in isolation that there arises the notion that there are two kinds of knowledge, and
two kinds of objects of knowledge, so opposed to each other that philosophy must
either  choose  which  is  ‘real’  or  find  some  way  of  reconciling  their  respective
‘realities.’ (Dewey 1938: 67)
46 In  order  to  overcome  inquiring  into  objects  of  knowledge  in  isolation,  Dewey’s
descriptions at this point seem to shift into phenomenological accounts of how it is like to
experience a situation. He begins to describe a kind of “quality” that is sensed or felt in a
situational context. He is quick to correct this use of words not to invite the impression of
the  situational  quality  being  equivalent  to  a  feeling,  an  emotion,  or  “anything
mentalistic.”  He  ventures  on  to  say  that,  on  the  contrary,  emotions,  feelings  and
sensations themselves can only be described on account of the uniqueness of situations.
His descriptions, of course, are not phenomenological in the sense of wanting to capture
the essence of pure experience in isolation of any judgement. Rather, at this point his
work becomes especially innovative, leaving behind traditional disciplinary boundaries,
trying to convey an inseparability of a qualitative aspect of the situation’s “controlling
presence” and judgements at work, which never occur in isolation, but in relation to a
kind of situational “implying” that Dewey is clear to distinguish from logical implication.
The  experienced  situation’s  “regulating  function”  and  its  “pervasive  and  unifying
quality,” as in works of art, feed into distinctions that are relevant or coherent in relation
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to  the  situation  (cf.  Dewey  1938:  68f.;  Dewey  1931).  In  the  course  of  this  process,
distinctions evolve in interaction with the experienced situation, changing both, because
a new description or solution, which emerges out of situational experience leads into a
new situation.
47 At this point contemporary philosophers worry about a Deweyan lapse into givenism. This
critique, as mentioned above, has recently been forwarded by Koopman, who warns that
contemporary pragmatists who are eager to retrieve the classicopragmatist accounts of
experience must be on guard to not treat experience as a kind of ultimate given-ness
against which we might be able to measure our practical knowings, doings, and sharings
(that is, our epistemic, ethical, and political practices) (Koopman 2009: 76f.).
48 Understanding Koopman’s objection, we want to slow down at this point. If a situation
were “there” in this manner as “something” regulating in a “given” way as a foundation
for true distinctions, then Dewey’s notion of situations would have to be dismissed as
naive. Also, if his use of the term “quality of a situation” would imply something static,
univocally there, something outside of the cognitive process, guaranteeing the adequacy
of  its  representations,  then  Dewey’s  remarks  concerning  situations  would  instance
givenism.
49 However,  Dewey’s  notion  of  situations  has  to  be  grasped  first  and  foremost  in
interactional  terms.  This  will  become  more  evident  through  Gendlin’s  approaches
carrying Dewey’s insistence on the function of situations even further. We understand
Dewey’s  emphasis  on  a  situational  quality  as  an  invitation  to  consider  practice  as
necessarily  rooted  in  body-environment  interactions.  It  is  no  coincidence  that  he
mentions the functions of a situation not only in his article on “Qualitative Thought,” but
also in his naturalistic account of logic.
50 While developing the rules and capacities of thought and language on the basis of body-
environment interaction as one integration, Dewey trains his readers not to consider
both terms (body and environment) apart.5 He writes:
If what is designated by such terms as doubt, belief, idea, conception, is to have any
objective meaning,  to say nothing of  public  verifiability,  it  must be located and
described as behavior in which organism and environment act together, or inter-act.
(Dewey 1938: 33; original emphasis)
51 Let us suggest that experiencing a situation is enacting this integration and interaction
on the complex level of human living and languaging (cf. Gendlin below). This allows us
to  consider  situations  as  forms  of  interaction  in  which  perceptions,  beliefs,  actions,
meanings,  contexts  and  environments  are  not  given  as  separable  elements,  but  as
interdependent and interconnected. Whatever we single out in descriptions of situations,
is a result of implicit or explicit differentiation-processes and of focused attention, with
rich details playing important roles, which could open up to further details. The various
degrees of subtlety in which we can talk about situations are decisive for individual or
collective life. That the quality of a situation is not “given” like a perceivable quality, but
is itself interaction, this is surprisingly to be found in Dewey’s remarks on scholarly work.
There he indicates different kinds of access to a challenging situation or problem, and he
stresses  a  situation  as  a  starting  point  of  thinking  that  is  primary,  and  more
encompassing than any given observation and or conceptual framework at hand:
[…] it is more or less a commonplace that it is possible to carry on observations that
amass facts tirelessly and yet the observed “facts” lead nowhere. On the other hand,
it  is  possible  to  have  the  work  of  observation  so  controlled  by  conceptual
Cognition as a Transformative Process
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
11
framework fixed in advance that the very things which are genuinely decisive in
the problem in  hand and its  solution,  are  completely  overlooked.  Everything is
forced into the predetermined conceptual and theoretical scheme. The way, and
the only way, to escape these two evils, is sensitivity to the quality of a situation as
a whole. In ordinary language, a problem must be felt before it can be stated. If the
unique quality of the situation is had immediately, then there is something that
regulates the selection and the weighing of observed facts and their conceptual
ordering. (Dewey 1938: 70)
52 This real-life example indicates that Dewey’s formulations about quality of a situation are
not to be misread as givenism, as a given factor, which only needs to be perceived and
represented “to get  it  right.”  Rather,  accessing the felt  quality of  a  situation can be
rephrased as an active process of becoming aware of a feeling dimension, in which feeling
itself is an interactional process instead of a mental entity. In Dewey’s observations we
notice the attention he gives when he focuses on a situation as interactional living that
can be conceptually distinguished in many different ways.
53 Dewey’s philosophically unusual direct and close description, as with Gendlin, will lead to
a dense understanding of subtle practices. This is opening up a detailed account of the
explicative  process  as  cognition  on  the  move,  changing  the  situation  as  well  as  the
nuances of the meaning of words used in it, by active ways of interacting, relating and
symbolizing.
54 Thus,  starting  with  Dewey,  one  can  understand  practice  on  the  basis  of  body-
environment interaction that can be described in ever more subtle details, as well as in
historical and social contexts, with first-person experience and feeling going along with
this. Only in considering particular situational needs and challenges can differences in
practice lead to progress and innovations. Situational experience consists of interactions
that need to be specifically understood and met, not in static constituents and conditions.
Dewey emphasizes:
Unless this fact is recognized, development becomes abnormal or at least unusual
matter  rather  than a  normal  feature  of  life  activities.  Need remains  a  constant
factor but it changes its quality. With change in need comes a change in exploratory
and searching activities, and that change is followed by a changed fulfillment or
satisfaction. Of human organisms it is especially true that activities carried on for
satisfying needs so change the environment that new needs arise which demand
still further change in the activities of the organism by which they are satisfied; and
so on in a potentially endless chain. (Dewey 1938: 28)
55 Thus Dewey’s Logic – A Theory of Inquiry ventures into a radical beginning of rationality in
the  organism’s  needful  and  productive  relation  to  its  environment  as  enacting  an
integration that maintains the living organism. The way things, and finally, categories
become significant in living process cannot be sufficiently understood in representational
terms, but by uncovering a situational-embodied dimension of need in which meaning is
grounded  in  ways  which  are  not  given,  hence,  “needs”  produce  responses,  actions,
structures – and further interaction. Considering this embodied-behavioral dimension of
meaning, Dewey becomes an acknowledged forerunner of the cognitive scientific turn to
Embodiment (Crippen 2016).  To become aware of this, he addresses his readers in an
unusually direct manner by bringing awareness to a context that exceeds the text;  a
context that involves the living process of the reader. He indirectly demonstrates that it
needs a different sort of concentration (practice!) to notice a situational background that
is not identical to the conceptually trained focus.
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The  reader,  whether  he  agrees  or  not  with  what  has  been  said,  whether  he
understands it  or not,  has,  as he reads the above passages,  a uniquely qualified
experienced situation, and his reflective understanding of what is said is controlled
by the nature of that immediate situation. One cannot decline to have a situation
for  that  is  equivalent  to  having  no  experience,  not  even  one  of  disagreement.
(Dewey 1938: 69)
56 Dewey’s invitation to direct attention away from the specific content to the “having” of a
situation,  manifests  itself  as  a  process  of  understanding,  whether  as  an  implicit
agreement or disagreement. This is a bold shift within intellectual routine, or better,
practice. It emphasizes a background of the cognitive process that is not in focus, but
necessarily functioning for concepts and percepts to make contextual sense and meaning.
However, this background is not a static given, but dynamic in character and requiring
radical  reflection  in  the  course  of  conceptual  thinking  to  become  noticed  (cf.  also
Schoeller/Saller 2016):
It would be a contradiction if I attempted to demonstrate by means of discourse,
the existence of  a universe of  experience.  It  is  not a contradiction by means of
discourse to invite the reader to have for himself that kind of immediately
experienced  situation  in  which  the  presence  of  a  situation  as  a  universe  of
discourse is seen to be the encompassing and regulating condition of all discourse.
(Dewey 1938: 69)
57 Claire Petitmengin’s research on the emergence of ideas demonstrates that this kind of
discursive invitation to notice implicit aspects of situational experiencing is a difficult,
yet not impossible affair. Again, it requires practice and special methodologies developed
for  this  purpose.  Her  elaborate  interview  techniques  lead  to  surprising  results  that
manifest in new, precise descriptions and distinctions of the emergent characteristics of
the cognitive process.  The transmodal quality of the descriptions of her interviewees
blurs a rigid distinction between inner and outer, thus also undermining presumptions of
“inner” and “outer sense” (cf. McDowell 1996: 22). Her thick descriptions of these subtle
interactional processes even find applications in fields such as pedagogy and therapy (cf.
Petitmengin 2007, Petitmengin 2016, Schoeller 2016).
58 In Dewey’s  understanding of  situations,  the philosophical  picture of  isolated subjects
giving rise to the constant worry about the connection of human knowledge to the world,
is left far behind. With Dewey we can think about how every epistemic move may prove
to be clarifying or relevant, not by comparing it with a “given” immediate experience, but
by  experiencing  the  transformation  of  the  situation,  that  has  thus  become possible.
Arguments are not isolated propositions, but need to be understood in an environment of
further  arguments  and  counter-arguments,  occasioning  change,  satisfying  needs  and
developing  novelties  within  the  situational  interaction.  This  can  be  deliberately
cultivated in a responsive kind of cognitive practice, as we would like to demonstrate in
this final part of the paper.
 
5. Gendlin’s Functional Relationships and Felt Sensing
59 Rightly,  one  may  ask  why  we  include  Gendlin  in  our  choice  of  Classical  Pragmatist
authors. With the following section we want to indicate to what extent Gendlin, student
of Dewey’s student Richard McKeon, continues the Classical Pragmatist endeavor to think
cognition and meaning in continuous terms of body-environment interaction (Gendlin
1997). His close-up study of the explicative process carefully explores and distinguishes
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the roles played by situational experience (Gendlin 1962). Gendlin’s work allows us to
trace the transformation of a situation by means of the subtle interaction of symbols and
experienced  situation,  creating  freshly  nuanced  meaning  with  every  propositional
transition.  The Classical  Pragmatist’s  emphasis  on the particular  situation gains  new
momentum with Gendlin, as the young philosopher is involved in Carl Roger’s research
consisting of the empirical study of the effect of therapy. Gendlin discovers very specific
conditions of a transformative conceptualization of ordinary experience. His first book on
Experiencing and the Creation of Meaning (Gendlin 1962) evolves from these interdisciplinary
practices and perspectives. It integrates the vital functions of what he calls “experienced
meaning” and later “felt sense” into his philosophical approach to language. His widened
notion  of  feeling  and  emotion  are  today  re-affirmed  by  cognitive  scientists  and
philosophers (cf. Ratcliffe 2008, Damasio 1994).
60 In his field research, Gendlin notices that some people during a therapy session interrupt
and pause the automated flow of speech, in order to attend and feel what they are trying
to say.
61 His research proves that by attending to a felt  meaning of situations and events,  the
semantic contents during therapies change in major shifts. These changes manifest in
embodied-experiential  ways,  clarifying  the  actual  issue,  problem  or  situation  with
measurable release of tension. Gendlin writes: “Statements that speak-from the felt sense
can be recognized by the fact that they have an effect on the felt sense. It moves, opens,
and  develops.”  (Gendlin  2004:  1;  original  emphasis).  Feeling  and  articulating  in  this
manner changes the felt quality of situations, in ways that a detached conceptual grasp, a
narrative or an analytic understanding cannot provide (Gendlin 1961; 1964).
62 Gendlin’s phenomenological close-up studies thus observe further functional aspects of
the quality of  a  situation,  which Dewey began to notice.  A felt  situation from which
clients speak in sessions, shifts and responds to the way it is articulated. It is not a given
foundation of propositional truths, yet the manifestation of an ongoing interaction of
symbolization  and  situational  living  that  requires  attentiveness  and  responsive
articulation,  which can be practiced.  The therapy-session thus becomes a magnifying
glass  on  daily  speech  acts.  While  ordinary  language  philosophy  emphasizes  clear
intentions as the condition of meaning, Gendlin shows how subject matters can develop,
without clear intentional referents, yet in close felt relation to experienced messy and
complex situations (Schoeller 2018a; 2018b).  This explicative process consists in more
than being able to follow logical and syntactical rules and speaking according to learned
language games.  Thus the explicative practice  of  a  gradual  clarifying content,  which
Gendlin analyzes,  provides not only new approaches in therapy andthe philosophy of
language,  but  also  in  neurophenomenological  and  cognitive  research  on  creativity
(Petitmengin  2007,  Colombetti  2009,  Schoeller  2017,  Schoeller  2018a).  In  Classical
Pragmatist spirit, Gendlin does not stay in the ivory tower of a philosophical discourse
that is concerned only with the problems of philosophers, but dedicates his approach to
the  challenges  of  real  life  problems  in  transforming  his  findings  into  practices
(“Focusing”  and  “Thinking  at  the  Edge”)  which  help  to  deal  with  the  intricacy  and
complexity of modern day situations (cf. Gendlin 1981; 2004).
63 In  Experiencing  and  the  Creation  of  Meaning  (1962),  Gendlin  conceptualizes  the  mutual
transformative  relation  of  symbols  and  “experienced  meaning”  as  functional
relationships.6 It is important to note here, that Gendlin’s use of the word “functional
relationship” is meant in a literal way. Taking Dewey’s use of the word “function” a step
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further, Gendlin distinguishes seven well defined respects in which situational experience
functions in language-use and vice versa.  As one of the most basic features of  these
relations,  Gendlin makes us aware of  the remarkable fact  that  one does not  have to
choose between hundreds of words to say something in a situation.
The coming of words is  so clever!  They come specifically and newly phrased to
make just  your point!  The words come with their past uses taken into account.
Much that  you have read and know is  taken account of,  as  well  as  the present
situation, what you just heard these people say, what you know of them from other
times, even the peculiar way in which this group uses certain words. Why are words
and situations  inherently  together  in  the  bodily  focaling  that  implies  the  right
words? (Gendlin 1991: 104f.; original emphasis)
64 The sensitive interaction of  symbolizing and feeling in situations (1997,  chapter VIII)
allows a detailed account on cognition as a responsive transformational practice. Again,
felt meaning or “felt sense” is not considered as “given” by Gendlin. In his main work A
Process  Model  (2018a)  he  develops  a  notion  of  feeling  as  a  dynamic,  ever  responsive
product of a hyper-complex interaction process in which the body and different kinds of
environments evolve and change together.
65 The philosophical  relevance of Gendlin’s work must therefore be indicated in several
different ways. In terms of philosophy of language, his close-up studies of the explication
process are an important contribution in overcoming a representational  as  well  as  a
constructive model of meaning. Gendlin’s introduction of the technical term “carrying
forward” (Gendlin 2004) opens up a new and phenomenological concise conceptualization
of conceptuality in terms of process. When one is able to conceptualize what one thinks
or  feels,  the  formulation  “carries”  an  experiential  process  “forward”  as  much  as  it
specifies the meaning of the words one uses. What one says thus does not represent some
‘given,’ nor does it construct an (inner or outer) world. Formulating becomes a change-
process  on  several  interacting  levels,  yet  not  in  an  arbitrary  way  (Schoeller  2018a).
Gendlin’s term of “carrying forward” does justice to the difficulty we often encounter
when Saying What We Mean (Gendlin 2018b, Schoeller 2017, Schoeller 2018a), and to the
precision needed to formulate something in scientific,  creative or daily contexts that
makes a difference, by clarifying or transforming a situation, a problem, a thought or
feeling.  In  terms  of  epistemology,  Gendlin’s  thinking  makes  it  necessary  to  face  the
challenge  to  think  body-environment  interaction,  behavior,  situations,  culture  and
language together to grasp the challenge of meaning (Schoeller & Dunaetz 2018). In this
way, Gendlin needs to be counted to the pioneers of an embodied approach to meaning as
early  as  the 1960ies,  deeply  disturbing conventional  distinctions  such as  subject  and
object, body and mind, nature and culture, inside and outside etc. Gendlin does not only
criticize a dualistic approach to the world, but delivers a robust alternative model of
thinking (Gendlin 2018a, Schoeller 2018b). This introduces new basic distinctions which
“carry forward” an understanding of meaning, while at the same time requiring a style or
practice of thinking that becomes decisively more self-reflective. 
66 Re-conceptualizing Dewey’s term of situational implying (cf. Dewey 1931) as a precise, yet
indeterminate need characterizing the body-environment interaction, Gendlin engages
an “implying” that manifests in his own conceptual generating. He thereby develops an
increasingly complex understanding of the phenomenon by radically reflecting each of
his conceptual moves as always happening into an implicit context,  each “occurring”
(happening) “into an implying” that is thereby changed in intricate ways. He engages and
unfolds  this  kind  of  continuity  as  the  principle  of  emerging  novelty,  in  which  new
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possibilities of reflective process open up responsively to concepts, yet not determined by
them (cf. Gendlin 1997).
67 Deriving the development of  meaning on these grounds,  Gendlin can gradually build
conceptual tools that make conceivable how a situational feeling, and even slight changes
in attending to it, can function in the coming of specific words attuned to the demands of
the situation. The present situation becomes understandable as richly layered implicit
process, in which a vast past is actively functioning. Feeling a situation, let alone speaking
from it, becomes conceivable as a change-process that shifts in more ways than can be
said simultaneously. Since each word is “a gigantic system of situation-changes and other
words” (Gendlin 1991: 104f.), applying words is itself a crossing that creates new meaning,
a  term Gendlin introduces  and which allows us  to  think beyond representational  or
constructivist models. The concept of crossing (Gendlin 1995), however, does not only
apply to the use of language but to every occurrence: whatever happens interacts, that is,
“crosses with” embodied situational living process, in which past occurrences function in
forming the next event, regenerated and changed by the present. Therefore particular
events include more implicit intricacy than we can propositionally spell out, and body-
experiencing freshly exceeds what is conceptually differentiated. This also implies the
necessity  to  philosophically  cultivate  a  kind of  attentiveness  that  expands  the  usual
conceptual focus on propositions. Gendlin’s methods “Focusing” and “Thinking-at-the-
Edge” exercise awareness for “what goes without saying” – for the subtly felt changes and
shifts going on while articulating. Let us give a simple example. When seeing an inspiring
film and speaking about it later on, the impact might easily shrivel away the more the
analysis takes over. In other instances, however, the meaningfulness of the experience
can grow and lead to further connections, clarifying, while we speak, the richly complex
implications  we  felt.  Gendlin  suggests  that  these  semantic  differences  result  from a
difference in explicative practice. Experiencing the impact of what we and others say, and
speaking from that experience, adds another kind of precision to articulation; it provides
situationally felt differentiations. If that happens, then we are glad we spoke. If, however,
what we thought and experience shrivels while explicating, Gendlin has a simple piece of
advice. He suggests pausing and sensing, “…..” – and then have other words come from
there:
We hope that the person will enter further into this “.....,” this edge, [...] When what
wants to be spoken is only partly formed, if you can stand it as a “.....,” then odd and
quite newly formed phrases soon come from it. They develop it further, but not into
something else, rather into something that follows from what you wanted to say
and carries ‘it’ forward. (Gendlin 1999: 205)
 
6. Conclusion
68 Peirce’s groundbreaking semiotic perspective opened up a new horizon for considering
thought processes. The novelty of his approach consists in understanding that we “have
no power of thinking without signs” (CP 2.265). Looking at the development from Peirce
to Dewey, and then Gendlin, we have detected a coherent development of understanding
knowledge as  a  transformational  process,  starting  with iconic  Firstness,  through the
having of  situations, to the close interaction of situational experience and symbols.  All
three  thinkers  thereby  also  show  that  meaning  extends  beyond  symbolic
conceptualization.  Peirce  makes  us  aware  that  indeterminate  or  complex  situational
feelings,  resemblances  and  occurrences  must  be  considered  as  signs,  as  intrinsically
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relating to other characteristics, thoughts and objects. What endows meaning to things,
as Terrence Deacon today reformulates, is always “an interpretive process” (Deacon 1997:
62),  encompassing  different  sign  levels  and  experiential  stages.  Conceptuality  as
understood in current debates is only one aspect of this process.
69 Dewey’s  notion  of  a  situation  exemplifies  this  point  further.  Although  his  situation
appears to have little in common with a semiotic perspective at first sight, we suggest an
underlying systematic  continuity.  The situation,  characterized by  Dewey as  a  feeling
which functions in discourse, could be viewed in the Peircean spirit as a moment in the
developing  system  of  interconnected  signs  on  different  levels.  However,  Dewey
contributes a further aspect, by emphasizing the importance of engaging the qualitative
feeling of the situation as a subtle practice for gaining relevant distinctions.
70 In our opinion, this classical pragmatist approach goes further than “hopeful cultural
criticism” (cf. Koopman 2009). Thinking closely from the predicaments of daily life and its
challenges and conceiving thinking as a continuity that manifests in the precision of
changed practice is more than hopeful criticism. It becomes life-changingly fruitful in
methods that actually help to meet the demands of  complex situations.  This is  what
Gendlin demonstrates with his practices that are underpinned by his philosophy.  His
practices of Focusing and Thinking-at-the-Edge make the complex continuity of body-
environment-interaction, thought, feeling and symbol deliberately accessible, in daily life
as well as in scientific and creative work (cf. Tokumaru 2011, Deloch 2010). 
71 Although often neglected by mainstream academic philosophy, it is indisputable that the
inspirational  impact  of  the  classical  pragmatists’  approach  to  knowledge  not  only
overcomes  traditional  dualistic  impasses  of  thinking,  but  opens  up  new  avenues  of
theory,  research and practice  in many different  fields  outside of  philosophy such as
sociology, psychology, social anthropology and pedagogy. By conceiving knowledge as a
transformative and interactional  process,  these  thinkers  demonstrate  a  dimension of
experiential  “firstness” that  does not  imply falling back into the Myth of  the Given.
Rather, by starting to spell out the complexity involved in conceptuality, they shift the
challenges we need to consider: the intricacy of embodied and situated interactional-
processes that functions in concepts which make sense,  which are true or false,  and
which are performative in having the power to  carry situations  forward.  Today,  the
paradigm of embodiment in cognitive science is  acknowledged and proves congruent
with  their  basic claims,  showing  how  ahead  of  their  times  these  thinkers  were.  In
analytical philosophy, more and more classical pragmatist inspirations are re-integrated
in order to deal with the epistemological problems of the Myth of the Given. Yet, the
radical nature of Classical Pragmatist thinking of continuity on different levels is not yet
tapped in its full potential. We trust that our study will inspire more detailed inquiry and
commitment in pursuing this rich heritage for contemporary approaches to knowledge
and meaning. On this note, we end with a quote from Peirce:
Thought must live and grow in incessant new and higher translations, or it proves
itself not to be genuine thought. (CP 5.594)
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NOTES
1. Cf. CP 5.183, and the commentary of Viola 2012. During his time as a lecturer at John Hopkins
University Peirce worked together on experiments with Joseph Jastrow, who later on was the
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first who described the ambiguous picture of a duck-rabbit. The philosopher and the psychologist
examined subliminal perception (cf. Jastrow 1916).
2. In his later works, he termed the accordance of meaning with truth – although only virtual
potential – within his semiotic grid as the dynamic object.
3. We choose this unusual verb, inspired by the terminology of Aristotle (compare the following
footnote) because we wanted avoid every possible idea of representation. 
4. “Spoken words are symbols [symbola] of affections of the psyche; written words are symbols of
spoken words. Like written words, spoken words are not the same for all persons. The affections
of the psyche, however, of which these are primarily signs [semeia], are the same for all, as are
also  the  objects  [pragmata]  of  which  the  affections  are  likenesses  [homoiomata].”  De
Interpretatione (16a3-7). 
5. “The processes of living are enacted by the environment as truly as by the organism; for they
are an integration.” (Dewey 1938: 25; original emphasis).
6. He  distinguishes  between  direct  reference,  recognition,  explication,  metaphor,
comprehension, relevance, circumlocution.
ABSTRACTS
The paper elaborates the classical pragmatist understanding of cognition as a transformational
process. The pragmatists’ emphasis on the situatedness of cognition, on abductive moves and
feeling  will  also  be  discussed  in  the  light  of  the  contemporary  debate  on  conceptuality  and
givenism. Our inquiry on a classical pragmatist approach shifts today’s emphasis on knowledge
qua justification of belief and suggests ways to transcend the dualism of conceptuality vs. non-
conceptuality. Reconsidering the Peircean category of Firstness, Dewey’s quality of situations and
Gendlin’s felt sense as subtle tacit moments in cognitive processes enhance a fine-grained and
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